Akira Iriye does a excellent job in his book, Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War, of providing the context in which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor took place. By using primary documents of the political exchanges that took place between the two countries and the thinking behind those communications he gives a balanced view of the surprise attack. He also includes essays by noted historians regarding the positions held by the major countries which were directly impacted by the events which led up to and including the attack and eventual entry into World War Two by the United States.
Iriye begins with a brief review of how the world was situated, in Europe and Asia, just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were bogged down militarily in China and were trying to erase the influence of western cultures in the Asian Pacific. The United States were trying to keep the Allied forces alive in Europe while facing an increasingly “hostile” Japanese threat in the Pacific who was now allied with Germany and Italy.
The documents of the negotiations between Japan and the United States provide an understanding of just how far apart politically Japan and the United States were. Japan did not see themselves as an aggressor in the Pacific, rather, they were simply trying to wrest control of Asia from colonial interests. Japan did not think it illogical to have a treaty with de facto American ally and enemies, the Soviet Union and the Axis powers. Japan also desired to have a political meeting between the leaders of Japan and the United States to hammer out an agreement rather than have an agreement drawn up beforehand.
The United States saw Japanese actions in Asia as direct threats to American interests, largely economic, in the area. A sticking point in the negotiations were Japanese ties to Germany and Italy, and the economic and material aid Japan could provide their allies. Also, politically the United States needed an agreement to be arranged by diplomats before it could be moved through the governmental system.
It was this clash of political and economic ideas that led to the Japanese thinking the Americans were delivering ultimatums backed by economic pressures and the Americans believing that the Japanese were acting no less different than the Germans in Europe.
In the second part of the book, Iriye gives a brief description of the countries who stood to gain or lose from the attack on Pearl Harbor. These include China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and its Commonwealth, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, French Indochina, and Germany. He then includes essays from a variety of historians from these countries who have studied the conflict and given their perspective on how the events unfolded and the impact the surprise attack had on their country and World War Two.
Iriye’s intent is not to place a blame on who was at fault but to rather look at how the event unfolded between the two nations and what it meant on a global scale. While some may argue that his work is tilted toward the Japanese, I would argue that it is balanced and he is successful. When you read the Hull Note it seems like a reasonable outline from the American point of view but paired with the Japanese thinking (they were negotiating in a situation, through diplomats, they were not comfortable with) the note becomes an ultimatum rather than an outline for negotiation. It is important to note that the Japanese were trying to negotiate to avoid a war while the United States felt war with Japan was inevitable.
In addition, the Japanese were negotiating at a disadvantage since the United States knew ahead of time what would be proposed since they had broken the Japanese diplomatic code. When you pull in the military thinking of not only the Japanese and Americans but other countries as well as to when and where the Japanese would strike at the United States, it becomes pretty clear that Japan did what it felt it had to do to gain an advantage over an enemy which was more capable of waging war than they were and nobody expected them to strike at Pearl Harbor.
I found it interesting that, given the world situation, the United States sold oil to Japan for nearly a year after Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Another point of interest was even though they were allies, the Axis did not coordinate their plans better when they had multiple opportunities with regards to the Soviet Union (that “guiding hand of fate” theory). Lastly, I liked how Iriye detailed just what codes the United States did break, diplomatic ones, and just how little information about the surprise attack they consequently knew.
Iriye’s work, like most of the Bedford Series, is college level
material. However, the essays in part two would be useful in a secondary
setting to set up an interesting discussion which brings in the various
viewpoints of different nations involved in World War Two. As always,
the documents are a valuable source of primary sources for any study of
the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States entry into the war.